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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
BECKER, Chief Judge. 
 
In this putative class action, plaintiff Martin Schnall 
alleges that the newspaper advertisements and account 
disclosures of defendant Amboy National Bank ("the Bank") 
violated the Truth in Savings Act ("TISA"), 12 U.S.C. 
SS 4301-13, and regulations promulgated by the Federal 
Reserve Board pursuant to the Act. In particular, Schnall 
contends that the Bank failed to calculate the advertised 
annual percentage yield ("APY") on its money market 
savings accounts according to the methods prescribed by 
the regulations and required by the statute. The District 
Court granted summary judgment for the Bank, holding 
that the advertisements and disclosures at issue did not 
violate TISA or the relevant regulations, and that even if 
they did, Schnall had failed to show that he was misled by 
the advertised rates. Schnall appeals, and we reverse, 
holding that the advertisements and disclosures at issue 
violated TISA and the Act's implementing regulations. This 
holding is buttressed by the letter-brief of the Federal 
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Reserve Board of Governors, amicus curiae at the request 
of the Court, which endorses this position. 
 
Schnall brought this suit pursuant to 12 U.S.C.S 4310, 
which has since been repealed. See infra note 2. This 
section created a private cause of action for TISA violations, 
and provided for actual damages as well as statutory 
damages of between $100 and $1,000 in an individual 
action and "such amount as the court may allow" in a class 
action. See 12 U.S.C. S 4310. The Bank contends that even 
if there was a violation, Schnall may not recover statutory 
damages because he failed to establish that he was misled 
by or relied on the advertised rates or that he was 
financially harmed by the TISA violation. However, we hold 
that TISA imposes strict liability on depository institutions 
that violate its disclosure requirements, and that to recover 
statutory damages under S 4310, a plaintiff need not show 
that he relied to his detriment on the advertised APY, that 
he was misled by the advertised APY, or that he was 
financially harmed by the TISA violations. We therefore 
conclude that Schnall is entitled to partial summary 
judgment on the question of liability and will remand for a 
determination of damages. 
 
I. 
 
At various times between October 18, 1998 and October 
10, 1999, the Bank placed in the Newark Star-Ledger a 
number of substantially identical advertisements promoting 
its Money Market Accounts. In bold letters and large 
typeface, these advertisements offered "a 3-month bonus of 
6.00% APY." In smaller print, the advertisements stated 
that "[a]fter the bonus your yield is based on the 3-month 
Treasury Bill. Plus, we'll guarantee that the yield will 
always be higher than the combined average yield offered 
by the 3 largest NJ banks." The advertisements also set 
forth the APY that the accounts had earned during the 
previous year. 
 
Consumers who called the phone number listed on the 
advertisements would receive from the Bank an application 
and Disclosure of Account Terms and Fees ("account 
disclosure"), which stated the APY in the same manner as 
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the advertisements. In particular, the account disclosure 
stated that an APY of 6% would apply for a period of 90 
days from the date the account is opened. After that, "the 
Interest Rate paid on your account is based on the 3-month 
Treasury Bill and is guaranteed to be at least 1.00% higher 
than the average money market account yields of First 
Union/NJ, PNC Bank/NJ and Summit Bank as of the last 
business day of the previous month." 
 
On October 16, 1998, before any of the advertisements at 
issue had been published, Schnall called the Bank to 
request an account application. On October 26, 1998, after 
seeing the advertisements described above, Schnall again 
phoned the Bank to request an application. The Bank sent 
Schnall an account disclosure and application, which he 
executed and returned, together with a check for $20,000 
to open the advertised account. On or about October 28, 
1998, the Bank received Schnall's application and check, 
and opened a Money Market Account in his name. 
 
On October 18, 1999, Schnall filed this action on behalf 
of himself and a putative class of all persons who had 
deposited at least $20,000 into a Money Market Account 
with the Bank during the period from October 18, 1998 to 
October 18, 1999. The complaint alleged that the APY that 
appeared in the Bank's advertisements and account 
disclosures failed to comply with the required method of 
calculating the advertised APY under TISA and its 
implementing regulations. In particular, Schnall contends 
that under the regulations, the Bank may not advertise a 
6% APY for the first three months and a variable rate APY 
for the remainder of the account term. Rather, in Schnall's 
submission, the regulations require the Bank to advertise a 
single "blended," or "composite," APY that represents the 
total yield on the account over a term of one year. 
According to Schnall, the regulations require this blended 
APY to be computed by applying the introductory rate for 
the first three months and applying whatever the variable 
rate was at the time of the advertisements for the remaining 
nine months, even though the resulting blended APY, which 
the Bank is required to advertise, may differ from the 
actual APY at the end of the year, depending on whether 
the variable rate changes. 
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The District Court granted the Bank's motion for 
summary judgment and denied Schnall's cross-motion for 
partial summary judgment. In an oral opinion, the Court 
held that because the variable rate on the accounts is a 
function of both the 3-month Treasury Bill as well as the 
APY of three other banks, the requirement that 
advertisements disclose the APY as a single blended rate 
was inapplicable, and the advertisements therefore 
complied with TISA. The Court further concluded that even 
if the Bank's advertisements and account disclosures 
violated TISA, summary judgment in favor of the Bank was 
appropriate because Schnall had failed to produce 
sufficient evidence that he relied to his detriment on the 
advertised APY. 
 
The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction 
pursuant to 12 U.S.C. S 4310(e) and 28 U.S.C.S 1331, and 
this Court has appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
S 1291. We review de novo the District Court's disposition 
of the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment, see 
Woodside v. School Dist. of Philadelphia Bd. of Educ., 248 
F.3d 129, 130 (3d Cir. 2001), under the familiar standard 
set forth in the margin.1 We turn first to whether the 
advertisements and disclosures in question violated TISA 
and the implementing regulations, and then address 
whether TISA imposes strict liability on depository 
institutions that violate its disclosure requirements or 
whether a plaintiff must also establish reliance or some 
form of financial injury. 
 
II. 
 
Schnall commenced this suit pursuant to a now-repealed 
provision of TISA, which created a private right of action 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Summary judgment is proper if there is no genuine issue of material 
fact and if, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the non- 
moving party, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 
(1986). The judge's function at the summary judgment stage is not to 
weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter, but to 
determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. See Anderson v. 
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). 
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against "any depository institution which fails to comply 
with any requirement imposed under this chapter or any 
regulation prescribed under this chapter . . . ." 12 U.S.C. 
S 4310(a).2 Thus, Schnall may establish liability by showing 
that the Bank's advertisements and account disclosures 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Section 4310 was repealed as of September 30, 2001. See Act of Sept. 
30, 1996, Pub. L. 104-208, S 2604(a), 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-470 (1996) 
("Effective as of the end of the 5-year period beginning on the date of 
the 
enactment of this Act [September 30, 1996], section 271 of the Truth in 
Savings Act (12 U.S.C. S 4310) is repealed."). Although private parties 
may no longer sue for violations of TISA, the Federal Reserve Board 
retains authority to enforce compliance. See 12 U.S.C. S 4309. 
 
The Bank does not argue that S 4310 is inapplicable to this action, 
which was filed before S 4310 was repealed, and we believe that 
pursuant to 1 U.S.C. S 109, Schnall's action survives the repeal. Section 
109 provides that "[t]he repeal of any statute shall not have the effect 
to 
release or extinguish any . . . liability incurred under such statute, 
unless the repealing Act shall so expressly provide, and such statute 
shall be treated as still remaining in force for the purpose of sustaining 
any proper action . . . for the enforcement of such . . . liability." 
Since 
the repeal of S 4310 did not expressly provide for retroactive 
application, 
Schnall's claims survive under S 109. 
 
We acknowledge that it could be argued that S 109 does not apply in 
this case, because S 4310 contained, inter alia, a subsection conferring 
jurisdiction on district courts to hear private TISA actions. See 12 
U.S.C. 
S 4310(e). In repealing S 4310, Congress therefore withdrew jurisdiction, 
and the Supreme Court in Bruner v. United States , 343 U.S. 112 (1952), 
held that S 109 does not apply to repeals that simply withdraw the 
jurisdiction of a federal district court without extinguishing any 
liability. 
Id. at 116-17 ("[W]hen a law conferring jurisdiction is repealed without 
any reservation as to pending cases, all cases fall with the law."). We 
believe that Bruner is distinguishable, however, because unlike in 
Bruner, where the withdrawal of jurisdiction from federal district courts 
left the plaintiff with an alternate remedy in the Court of Claims, see 
343 
U.S. at 115, the repeal of S 4310 not only withdrew the jurisdiction of 
federal district courts to hear private TISA enforcement actions, but also 
entirely eliminated the cause of action, thereby releasing banks from 
future claims of private parties to recover actual and statutory damages 
for TISA violations. See De La Rama Steamship Co., Inc. v. United States, 
344 U.S. 386, 390 (1953) (holding that under S 109, pending appeals 
survive "the repeal of statutes which create rights and also prescribe how 
the rights are to be vindicated," and distinguishing "the repeal of 
statutes solely jurisdictional in their scope") (emphasis added). 
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violated either a provision of TISA itself or a regulation 
promulgated pursuant to TISA. We consider first whether 
the Bank's disclosures violated requirements imposed by 
the regulations, and then turn to whether the disclosures 
also violated requirements imposed by TISA itself. 
 
A. 
 
1. 
 
The relevant regulations were promulgated by the Federal 
Reserve Board pursuant to 12 U.S.C. S 4308(a), and are 
found in 12 C.F.R. Part 230, known as Regulation DD. 
Under the regulations, account disclosures and 
advertisements that state a rate of return are required to 
state the account's annual percentage yield. See  12 C.F.R. 
S 230.4(b)(1)(i) ("Account disclosures shall include the 
following, as applicable: . . . The `annual percentage yield' 
and the `interest rate,' using those terms . . . ."); 12 C.F.R. 
S 230.8(b) ("If an advertisement states a rate of return, it 
shall state the rate as an `annual percentage yield' using 
that term."). The regulations define "annual percentage 
yield" as "a percentage rate reflecting the total amount of 
interest paid on an account, based on the interest rate and 
the frequency of compounding for a 365-day period and 
calculated according to the rules in appendix A of this 
part." 12 C.F.R. S 230.2(c). 
 
Part I.A of appendix A provides that "[f]or accounts 
without a stated maturity date (such as a typical savings or 
transaction account), the calculation shall be based on an 
assumed term of 365 days."3 Because the accounts at issue 
in this case lack a stated maturity date, the advertised APY 
must therefore assume a term of 365 days. 
 
Part I.B of appendix A specifically defines how the APY 
should be computed for "stepped-rate accounts," which are 
accounts that apply different interest rates during different 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. For such accounts, Part I.A provides that"the annual percentage yield 
can be calculated by use of the following simple formula: APY = 100 
(Interest/Principal)," where "Interest" is the total dollar amount of 
interest earned on the Principal during the 365 day term. 
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periods of the term: "For accounts with two or more interest 
rates applied in succeeding periods . . . an institution shall 
assume each interest rate is in effect for the length of time 
provided for in the deposit contract." If, for example, a bank 
offers a savings account with a 7% interest rate for the first 
six months and a 3% interest rate thereafter, appendix A 
requires the advertised APY to be the blended rate 
calculated by applying the 7% interest rate for the first six 
months and the 3% interest rate for the remaining six 
months. 
 
Finally, Part I.C of appendix A specifies how this blended- 
rate calculation should be performed for a variable rate 
account, which the regulations define as "an account in 
which the interest rate may change after the account is 
opened." 12 C.F.R. S 230.2(v). Part I.C specifically defines 
the method of calculation for accounts such as those at 
issue in this case, where an initial fixed rate applies for a 
given period, followed by a variable rate for the remainder 
of the term: 
 
       Variable-rate accounts with an introductory premium 
       (or discount) rate must be calculated like a stepped- 
       rate account. Thus, an institution shall assume that: 
       (1) The introductory interest rate is in effect for the 
       length of time provided for in the deposit contract; and 
       (2) the variable interest rate that would have been in 
       effect when the account is opened or advertised (but for 
       the introductory rate) is in effect for the remainder of 
       the year. If the variable rate is tied to an index, the 
       index-based rate in effect at the time of disclosure 
       must be used for the remainder of the year. 
 
Part I.C illustrates the required method of calculation by 
using the example of an account that pays an introductory 
7% interest rate for the first three months and a variable 
rate thereafter, which at the time of the disclosure is 5%. In 
this example, the advertised APY must be computed by 
applying the 7% interest rate for the first three months and 
by applying the current 5% variable rate for the remaining 
nine months of the term, yielding an APY of 5.65%. Thus, 
in calculating the APY, a bank must assume that the 
variable rate that is in effect at the time of the disclosure 
will remain in effect throughout the term, even though this 
 
                                8 
  
assumption means that the APY that the regulations 
require the bank to advertise will differ from the actual APY 
that the consumer will earn on the account should the 
variable rate change. 
 
2. 
 
Applying this method of calculation to the Amboy Money 
Market Account, we agree with Schnall that the Bank's 
advertisements and account disclosures violate the 
regulations, since they fail to state the APY as a single 
composite rate computed on a one-year term, as required 
by appendix A. Instead of calculating the APY by applying 
the introductory 6% APY for the first three months and 
assuming that the variable rate at the time of the disclosure 
would remain in effect throughout the remaining nine 
months of the term, the Bank simply advertised an initial 
6% APY followed by a variable rate set by the 3-month 
Treasury Bill and guaranteed to exceed the combined 
average yield of New Jersey's three largest banks. 
 
The Bank contends that the District Court correctly 
concluded that the method of calculating the APY specified 
in appendix A is inapplicable because the variable rate in 
this case is determined not only by the 3-month Treasury 
Bill, but also by the average money market account yields 
of the three largest New Jersey Banks (First Union/NJ, PNC 
Bank/NH, and Summit Bank). We disagree. 
 
First, appendix A clearly states that with only one 
exception, not applicable to this case, the APY that is 
advertised must be calculated according to the specified 
method: "Except as provided in Part I.E. of this appendix, 
the annual percentage yield shall be calculated by the 
formula shown below."4 This statement definitively 
establishes that the specified formula must be applied in 
this case. 
 
Second, the regulations do not distinguish among 
different types of variable rates for purposes of computing 
the APY that must be advertised. Under Part I.C of the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. The exception in Part I.E applies to "time accounts with a stated 
maturity greater than one year that pay interest at least annually." 
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appendix, "Variable rate accounts with an introductory 
premium (or discount) rate must be calculated like a 
stepped-rate account." And the definitions section of the 
regulations provides that "[v]ariable-rate account means an 
account in which the interest rate may change after the 
account is opened." 12 C.F.R. S 230.2(v). Thus, the 
regulations treat all variable rates alike, regardless whether 
the rates are a function of one variable, two variables, or 
twenty variables. That the variable rate in this case, rather 
than being solely a function of the 3-month Treasury Bill, 
is a function of both the 3-month Treasury Bill and the 
combined average yield of the three largest New Jersey 
Banks, is immaterial for purposes of the regulations. 
 
Regardless of what the variable rate depends on, under 
the regulations a bank must determine what the variable 
rate would be at the time of the advertisement, and assume 
that that rate will remain in effect throughout the relevant 
part of the term, for purposes of computing the APY that 
the bank may advertise. Thus, the regulations require 
Amboy to advertise a single blended APY calculated by 
applying the 6% APY for the first three months and by 
applying for the remaining nine months whatever the 
current variable rate was at the time of the advertisement. 
This it did not do. 
 
3. 
 
The Bank urges us to adopt the District Court's 
reasoning that the guarantee that the APY for the 
remainder of the term would exceed the average APY of the 
Bank's three competitors is pro-consumer, and therefore 
that it should be allowed to advertise that fact. In our view, 
this argument proves too much, since it would apply to any 
variable rate that is determined by reference to an index or 
a competing investment. For example, a variable rate that 
is set to the 3-month Treasury Bill is pro-consumer, since 
it guarantees that consumers will never earn less on their 
savings account than they would on the Treasury Bill. 
Nonetheless, the regulations require that variable rates be 
advertised according to a particular formula, regardless of 
how pro- or anti-consumer the rate is. 
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The District Court also worried that the APY that the 
Bank would be required to advertise under the regulations 
would be misleading because "[i]t would not help the 
consumer know whether this particular snapshot will turn 
out to be accurate for the long run . . . ." We agree that the 
advertised rate required by the regulations may mislead 
consumers, since the advertised APY could differ from the 
actual APY. Consider two banks, one of which offers a fixed 
rate account with a 4% APY and the other of which offers 
a variable rate account that, using the variable rate in effect 
at the time of the advertisement, would have a 4% APY. 
Under the regulations, both banks must advertise the same 
APY of 4%, which risks misleading consumers to believe 
that the two investments are of equal value. This risk is 
mitigated, however, by the requirement that advertisements 
for variable rate accounts "shall state . . . clearly and 
conspicuously . . . that the rate may change after the 
account is opened." 12 C.F.R. S 230.8(c)(1). 
 
Moreover, even if the regulations required rates to be 
advertised in a misleading manner, unless the defendant 
challenged the regulations' validity, the Court would be 
constrained to apply the regulations that exist. Whether 
these regulations make sense as a matter of policy is 
irrelevant in this case, since the Bank does not challenge 
the regulations' validity on the grounds that the Federal 
Reserve Board exceeded its authority under TISA, acted 
arbitrarily and capriciously in promulgating the regulations, 
or failed to comply with the procedural requirements 
imposed by the Administrative Procedure Act. Absent such 
a challenge, a court may not second-guess the policy 
choices made by an agency in a matter that Congress has 
committed to the agency's discretion. 
 
4. 
 
We therefore conclude that the Bank's advertisements 
and account disclosures violated the regulations 
promulgated under TISA by failing to advertise the APY as 
a single composite rate based on a one-year term, 
calculated by applying the 6% introductory rate for the first 
three months and by applying whatever the variable rate 
was at the time of the advertisements for the remaining 
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nine months. We note that this conclusion is supported by 
an amicus letter brief filed at the Court's invitation by the 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. Signed 
by the Director of the Division of Consumer and 
Community Affairs, the letter concludes that "Amboy did 
not comply with the requirements set forth in Regulation 
DD because . . . the advertisements did not disclose a 
single `composite' APY, based on an assumed term of 365- 
days, and taking into account both the introductory rate 
and post-introductory rate in effect for these accounts at 
the time they were advertised." 
 
B. 
 
The Bank argues that even if its advertisements and 
account disclosures failed to comply with the regulations, 
the advertisements nonetheless complied with the statutory 
disclosure requirements. Therefore, the Bank submits, 
Schnall's claims were properly dismissed. We disagree. 
Even if the Bank's advertisements complied with the 
statutory requirements, the Bank would still be liable for 
violating the regulations, since at the time this lawsuit was 
filed, TISA imposed civil liability on any bank"which fails to 
comply with any . . . regulation prescribed under this 
chapter." 12 U.S.C. S 4310(a). 
 
At all events, we conclude that the Bank violated the 
statutory disclosure requirements. The Bank argues that its 
advertisements fully complied with the disclosure 
requirements of TISA, which requires that 
 
       Each advertisement . . . relating to any . . . interest- 
       bearing account . . . which includes any reference .. . 
       to a specific yield . . . shall state the following 
       information, to the extent applicable, in a clear and 
       conspicuous manner: 
 
       (1) The annual percentage yield. 
 
       (2) The period during which such annual 
       percentage yield is in effect. 
 
       (3) All minimum account balance and time 
       requirements which must be met in order to earn the 
       advertised yield . . . . 
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       (4) The minimum amount of the initial deposit 
       which is required to open the account in order to 
       obtain the yield advertised . . . . 
 
       (5) A statement that regular fees or conditions could 
       reduce the yield . . . . 
 
       (6) A statement that an interest penalty is required 
       for early withdrawal. 
 
12 U.S.C. S 4302(a). In the Bank's submission, by 
disclosing in its advertisements that its accounts would 
earn a 6% APY for the first three months, followed by an 
APY based on the 3-month Treasury Bill but guaranteed to 
exceed the average yield of New Jersey's three largest 
banks, the Bank complied with the requirement of 
S 4302(a)(1) that advertisements disclose the"annual 
percentage yield." 
 
The problem with the Bank's argument, however, is that 
TISA defines "annual percentage yield" as: 
 
       the total amount of interest that would be received on 
       a $100 deposit, based on the annual rate of simple 
       interest and the frequency of compounding for a 365- 
       day period, expressed as a percentage calculated by a 
       method which shall be prescribed by the Board in 
       regulations. 
 
12 U.S.C. S 4313(2). This definition of "annual percentage 
yield" applies to the requirements in SS 4302(a)(1) and 
4303(c)(1) that advertisements and account disclosures 
state the annual percentage yield. Because, as explained 
above, the Bank failed to calculate the APY appearing in its 
advertisements and account disclosures according to the 
method prescribed by the regulations, the Bank failed to 
comply with the statutory disclosure requirements imposed 
by SS 4302(a)(1) and 4303(c)(1). 
 
The District Court focused on the language "to the extent 
applicable" in S 4302(a), and concluded that the required 
method of computing the advertised APY is not applicable 
here, because the variable rate is a function of both the 3- 
month Treasury Bill and the average yield of three other 
banks. The District Court further reasoned that the method 
of calculating the APY specified in the regulations is 
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inapplicable in this case because "blind adherence" to the 
regulation "would not assist [the] consumer in comparing" 
Amboy's account with accounts offered by competitors. 
According to the District Court, applying the formula 
specified in the regulations would thereby frustrate one of 
the stated purposes of TISA, which is to enhance"the 
ability of the consumer to make informed decisions 
regarding deposit accounts." 12 U.S.C. S 4301. 
 
We disagree with the District Court's interpretation of "to 
the extent applicable" as an invitation to courts to disregard 
the mandate of the regulations if doing so makes sense as 
a matter of policy. In our view, the language "to the extent 
applicable" was included in S 4302(a) because certain 
disclosure requirements enumerated in that provision may 
not apply to a particular account, given the nature of the 
account. For example, S 4302(a)(6) requires advertisements 
to include "[a] statement that an interest penalty is required 
for early withdrawal." This requirement, however, would 
obviously be inapplicable to an account that has no 
withdrawal penalty. 
 
In contrast, the requirement under S 4302(a)(1) that 
advertisements disclose the account's APY is applicable to 
all interest-bearing accounts, including the account at 
issue in this case. As discussed above, the formula in the 
regulations for computing an account's APY is fully 
applicable to accounts such as Amboy's, which include an 
introductory fixed interest rate followed by a variable rate 
for the remainder of the term. 
 
In sum, we hold that by failing to disclose the APY on its 
accounts as a single blended rate based on a 365-day term, 
the Bank's advertisements and account disclosures violated 
both the disclosure requirements found in the regulations, 
see 12 C.F.R. SS 230.2, 230.4, 230.8 & appendix A to part 
230, and the disclosure requirements imposed by the 
relevant statutory provisions, see 12 U.S.C.SS 4302, 4303, 
4305 & 4313, which incorporate the regulations by 
reference. Either the violation of the statute or the violation 
of the regulations provides an independent ground for 
liability under S 4310. 
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III. 
 
The Bank argues that even if its advertisements and 
account disclosures violated the requirements imposed by 
TISA and the implementing regulations, the District Court 
properly granted summary judgment on the ground that no 
reasonable jury could find that Schnall was harmed by the 
manner in which the Bank disclosed the APY on its 
accounts. The Bank frames this argument in various terms, 
arguing that Schnall did not rely on the manner in which 
the Bank advertised its APY, that Schnall was not misled by 
the advertisements and disclosures, and that Schnall 
suffered no financial injury as a result of the TISA 
violations. Each characterization relates to the same 
conceptual question whether a TISA plaintiff must show 
that he or she suffered some financial injury that he would 
not have incurred had the defendant complied with TISA. 
Schnall responds that TISA imposes strict liability on 
depository institutions that violate its disclosure 
requirements, and that to recover under S 4310, a plaintiff 
need not show that he or she was misled or financially 
harmed by the violation. 
 
The relevant provision of TISA, 12 U.S.C. S 4310(a), which 
has been repealed since the commencement of this lawsuit, 
see supra note 2, provided that: 
 
       [A]ny depository institution which fails to comply with 
       any requirement imposed under this chapter or any 
       regulation prescribed under this chapter with respect 
       to any person who is an account holder is liable to 
       such person in an amount equal to the sum of -- 
 
       (1) any actual damages sustained by such person 
       as a result of the failure; 
 
       (2)(A) in the case of an individual action, such 
       additional amount as the court may allow, except 
       that the liability under this subparagraph shall not 
       be less than $100 nor greater than $1,000; or 
 
        (B) in the case of a class action, such amount as 
       the court may allow, except that-- 
 
        (i) as to each member of the class, no minimum 
       recovery shall be applicable; and 
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        (ii) the total recovery under this subparagraph in 
       any class action . . . arising out of the same failure 
       to comply by the same depository institution shall 
       not be more than the lesser of $500,000 or 1 
       percent of the net worth of the depository 
       institution involved; and 
 
       (3) in the case of any successful action to enforce 
       any liability under paragraph (1) or (2), the costs of 
       the action, together with a reasonable attorney's fee 
       as determined by the court. 
 
The question before us reduces to whether the language 
imposing liability for any violation "with respect to any 
person who is an account holder" requires account holders 
who bring suit to show that they would not have opened 
their account had the bank's disclosure complied with 
TISA, or that they were otherwise misled or financially 
harmed by the TISA violation. 
 
In deciding this question, we are writing on a clean slate, 
as this Court has not had occasion to construe S 4310. The 
only court squarely to address the issue was the District 
Court for the Southern District of New York in Hale v. 
Citibank, N.A., 198 F.R.D. 606 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). In an 
opinion by Judge Rakoff, the court in Hale rejected 
defendants' claim that reliance is a necessary element of a 
cause of action under S 4310: 
 
       [N]either the regulation nor TISA itself requires such a 
       showing as a condition of liability, and such exacting 
       notions of reliance, drawn from the common law, are 
       inapplicable, so far as liability is concerned, to a 
       regulatory statute like TISA whose stated purpose is"to 
       require the clear and uniform disclosure of . . . the 
       rates of interest which are payable on deposit accounts 
       by depository institutions." 12 U.S.C. S 4301(b) 
       (emphasis added); see also S. Rep. 102-167, at 80-82 
       (1991). 
 
Id. at 607.5 We find this reasoning persuasive.6 As the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. The court noted that reliance might be relevant, however, for purposes 
of determining actual (in contrast to statutory) damages. Id. 
 
6. The only other case to discuss the issue is Shelley v. AmSouth Bank, 
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Court in Hale noted, neither the statute nor the regulations 
explicitly require that a plaintiff show reliance or financial 
injury to recover statutory damages under S 4310. 
 
Moreover, the purpose of TISA is not only to prevent 
consumers from being misled by deceptive advertisements, 
but also to ensure uniformity in how banks advertise rates 
of return. See 12 U.S.C. S 4301 ("The Congress hereby finds 
that economic stability would be enhanced, competition 
between depository institutions would be improved, and the 
ability of the consumer to make informed decisions 
regarding deposit accounts, and to verify accounts, would 
be strengthened if there was uniformity in the disclosure of 
terms and conditions on which interest is paid and fees are 
assessed in connection with such accounts."). This 
consideration also supports the result reached in Hale. 
 
We read the regulations promulgated under TISA as 
representing a policy judgment by the Federal Reserve 
Board that even if consumers are not misled by 
advertisements that violate the regulations, they benefit 
from the requirement that banks advertise their returns 
according to a standard formula that allows quick and 
accurate comparison of the expected rates of return offered 
by different banks, thus promoting informed consumer 
choice and competition among banks. The harm that TISA 
is intended to prevent, therefore, is not only the financial 
harm that occurs when a consumer is misled by an 
advertisement, but also the information costs and anti- 
competitive effects created when banks advertise yields in 
non-uniform ways that make it difficult for consumers to 
compare the rates of return offered by competing banks. 
 
Contrary to the purpose of TISA, interpreting S 4310 to 
require reliance or financial injury would permit banks to 
violate TISA's uniform disclosure requirement as long as 
the advertisements issued by the banks were not 
themselves misleading. Indeed, the advertisements in this 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
No. 97-1170-rv-c, 2000 WL 1121778 (S.D. Ala. July 24, 2000), aff 'd, 
247 F.2d 250 (11th Cir. 2001), which briefly stated in dicta that 
"proximate cause and actual damages are not elements of a TISA claim 
for statutory damages." Id. at *14. 
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case, although they prominently feature the "6.00% APY," 
are quite clear that this APY is in effect for only an 
introductory period of three months. It would therefore be 
difficult for a consumer to show that he was misled by the 
advertisement into believing that the 6% APY would be in 
effect for longer than three months. Schnall, as an M.B.A. 
and statistician, see infra note 7, could have easily 
computed from the information in the Amboy advertisement 
the blended APY that the Bank was required to disclose, 
and could have then compared that APY to those offered by 
other banks. One of the purposes of TISA, however, is to 
relieve consumers of this burden, for comparing the yields 
offered by different banks may be difficult for many 
consumers and will take unnecessary time if the yields are 
not advertised uniformly. In order for the regulations in this 
case to have any bite, they must therefore be enforced even 
when advertisements are not necessarily misleading. 
 
To be sure, violations of TISA that do not actually cause 
consumers to be misled could still be prosecuted by the 
Federal Reserve Board. But the structure of S 4310, which 
permitted a plaintiff to recover both actual damages and 
statutory damages, suggests that this provision served the 
dual purpose of both compensating plaintiffs who have 
been misled and deterring banks from advertising in ways 
that Congress and the Federal Reserve Board believe are 
socially harmful. Cf. Williams v. Pub. Fin. Corp., 598 F.2d 
349, 356 (5th Cir. 1979) ("The remedial scheme in the 
[Truth in Lending Act] is designed to deter generally 
illegalities which are only rarely uncovered and punished, 
and not just to compensate borrowers for their actual 
injuries in any particular case."). 
 
We acknowledge that as a matter of policy, it seems odd 
to permit plaintiffs to sue banks for damages when they 
have personally suffered no financial loss as a result of the 
bank's TISA violation.7 This result, however, is what S 4310, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. A law professor probably could not have imagined a better 
hypothetical than this case, in which the plaintiff, Martin Schnall, has 
an M.B.A. from NYU and masters degrees from Columbia University and 
University of Michigan in biostatistics. Indeed, it is possible that 
Schnall 
never intended to invest his money in a savings account, but saw an 
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as a "private attorney general" statute, contemplated. 
Although TISA authorizes the Federal Reserve Board to 
enforce the Act, see 12 U.S.C. S 4309, the Board has 
limited resources to devote to enforcement, and Congress 
may have deemed it more cost-effective to cede TISA 
enforcement to individuals in the private sector who stand 
to profit from efficiently detecting and prosecuting TISA 
violations. 
 
We also note that S 4310 provided an affirmative defense 
to defendants who unintentionally violate TISA. See 12 
U.S.C. S 4310(c) ("A depository institution may not be held 
liable in any action brought under this section for a 
violation of this chapter if the depository institution 
demonstrates by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
violation was not intentional and resulted from a bona fide 
error, notwithstanding the maintenance of procedures 
reasonably adapted to avoid any such error."). Since a 
plaintiff who suffers actual financial harm as a result of 
being misled by a TISA violation will go uncompensated if 
the violation is inadvertent under S 4310, the primary 
purpose of S 4310 may not have been compensation, but 
rather deterrence. This deterrent purpose is furthered 
under S 4310 by permitting account holders to bring TISA 
actions even if they have not suffered any financial harm as 
a result of the violation. 
 
Finally, our conclusion is consistent with the 
jurisprudence construing the provision of the Truth in 
Lending Act ("TILA") upon which S 4310 appears to have 
been modeled. The private enforcement provision of TILA 
uses almost the same language as S 4310 in creating a 
private right of action: 
 
       [A]ny creditor who fails to comply with any requirement 
       imposed under this part . . . with respect to any person 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
advertisement that he knew violated TISA, and opened an account 
precisely so that he could then sue the bank under TISA and earn 
statutory damages. Under our construction of S 4310, such a plaintiff 
would nonetheless be entitled to statutory damages, making him better 
off than he would have been had TISA not been violated. 
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       is liable to such person in an amount equal to the sum 
       of -- 
 
       (1) any actual damage sustained by such person as 
       a result of the failure; 
 
       (2)(A)(i) in the case of an individual action twice the 
       amount of any finance charge in connection with the 
       transaction . . . ; or 
 
        (B) in the case of a class action, such amount as 
       the court may allow, except that as to each member 
       of the class no minimum recovery shall be 
       applicable, and the total recovery under this 
       subparagraph in any class action or series of class 
       actions arising out of the same failure to comply by 
       the same creditor shall not be more than the lesser 
       of $500,000 or 1 per centum of the net worth of the 
       creditor . . . . 
 
15 U.S.C. S 1640(a). A comparison of the language and 
structure of this provision with the language and structure 
of S 4310, quoted supra at 15-16, leaves little doubt that 
Congress, in enacting S 4310 in 1991, consciously borrowed 
the language of TILA. 
 
This Court has squarely held that reliance is not an 
element of a cause of action under TILA. See Manning v. 
Princeton Consumer Disc. Co., 533 F.2d 102, 106 (3d Cir. 
1976) ("Although it is extremely unlikely that the purchaser 
was not aware of the undisclosed terms, i.e., selling price, 
down payment and balance, we cannot say that the district 
court erred in imposing the penalty and attorneys' fees 
under the circumstances here."); see also Dzadovsky v. 
Lyons Ford Sales, Inc., 593 F.2d 538, 539 (3d Cir. 1979) 
(per curiam) (rejecting "the requirement of financial loss 
before a borrower may bring an action" under TILA). 
Indeed, as noted in the margin, those Courts of Appeals 
that have considered the issue are nearly unanimous that 
to recover statutory damages under TILA, plaintiffs need 
not show that they would not have agreed to the 
transaction had the lender's disclosure complied with TILA 
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or that they were otherwise misled or suffered financial 
injury as a result of the TILA violation.8  
 
Given the similar purposes of TISA and TILA and the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. See, e.g., Mars v. Spartanburg Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 713 F.2d 65, 66 
(4th Cir. 1983) ("The district court held that these violations were only 
technical and because [plaintiff] sustained no actual injury as a result 
of 
them, no liability on the part of the creditors arose. We disagree and 
reverse the judgment of the lower court."); Brown v. Marquette Sav. & 
Loan Ass'n, 686 F.2d 608, 614 (7th Cir. 1982) ("As an initial matter we 
note that the violation before us is a purely technical one, and that the 
plaintiffs do not claim that they were misled or suffered any actual 
damages as a result of the statutory violation. It is well settled, 
however, 
that a borrower need not have been so deceived to recover the statutory 
penalty."); Dryden v. Lou Budke's Arrow Fin. Co., 630 F.2d 641, 647 (8th 
Cir. 1980) ("TILA plaintiffs, otherwise entitled to recover, need not show 
that they sustained actual damages stemming from the TILA violations 
proved before they may recover the statutory damages the Act also 
provides for."); Smith v. Chapman, 614 F.2d 968, 971 (5th Cir. 1980) ("It 
is not necessary that the plaintiff-consumer actually have been deceived 
in order for there to be a [TILA] violation."); Hinkle v. Rock Springs 
Nat'l 
Bank, 538 F.2d 295, 297 (10th Cir. 1976) ("It is apparent that no 
showing of actual damages is required and instead the recovery is fixed 
by statute."). 
 
The only case to depart from strict liability under TILA is Streit v. 
Fireside Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 697 F.2d 193 (7th Cir. 1983), in which 
the defendant, a car dealer, allegedly violated TILA by neglecting to 
provide the plaintiff with a duplicate of the retail installment contract. 
Id. 
at 194. After paying a portion of the down payment, the plaintiff 
returned the car claiming that it was defective and refused to pay any 
installments. Id. at 194-95. The court rejected the plaintiff's TILA 
claim: 
 
       [I]t is not good policy and is not required by a reasonable 
       construction of the Act to hold a creditor liable for a technical 
       violation of the sort here involved: where the consumer was not 
       misled nor financially harmed and where the consumer unilaterally 
       breached the contract almost immediately after it was entered. The 
       purposes of the Act and the respect the Act is due are not served 
by 
       a rigid application that results in an unjustified windfall to the 
       consumer. 
 
Id. at 197. The holding in Streit therefore appears confined to the 
specific 
facts of that case -- namely the hyper-technical nature of the violation 
(failure to provide a duplicate of the finance agreement) and the 
plaintiff's own actionable conduct (breach of contract). 
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fairly substantial body of TILA caselaw that existed at the 
time Congress enacted TISA in 1991, we presume that 
Congress was aware of the judicial interpretation of TILA 
and that in borrowing language from TILA, Congress 
intended that language to have the same meaning that 
courts had given TILA.9 Cf. Northcross v. Bd. of Educ., 412 
U.S. 427, 428 (1973) (per curiam) (noting that "similarity of 
language . . . is, of course, a strong indication that . . . two 
statutes should be interpreted pari passu," particularly 
where "the two provisions share a common raison d'etre" 
(internal quotations omitted)). Since the TILA jurisprudence 
overwhelmingly rejects any reliance requirement, it seems 
likely that Congress did not intend to impose any such 
requirement under the similarly-worded provision of TISA. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that to recover 
statutory damages under S 4310, a plaintiff need not show 
that he relied on the advertised APY, that he would not 
have opened the account had the advertisement complied 
with TISA, or that he was otherwise misled or financially 
harmed by the failure to comply with TISA's disclosure 
requirements.10 
 
IV. 
 
Because we hold that the Bank's advertisements and 
account disclosures violated TISA and the implementing 
regulations, and because we hold that to recover statutory 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. The stated purpose of TISA is "to require the clear and uniform 
disclosure of . . . the rates of interest which are payable on deposit 
accounts by depository institutions . . . and the fees that are assessable 
against deposit accounts so that consumers can make a meaningful 
comparison between the competing claims of depository institutions with 
regard to deposit accounts." 12 U.S.C. S 4301(b). Similarly, the stated 
purpose of TILA is "to assure a meaningful disclosure of credit terms so 
that the consumer will be able to compare more readily the various 
credit terms available to him and avoid the uninformed use of credit, and 
to protect the consumer against inaccurate and unfair credit billing and 
credit card practices." 15 U.S.C. S 1601(a). 
 
10. To recover actual damages, however, a plaintiff must obviously show 
that he suffered some financial harm that he would not have suffered 
had the advertisements and disclosures in question complied with TISA. 
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damages an account holder need not show that he was 
misled or financially harmed by the defendant's failure to 
comply with TISA, we hold that Schnall is entitled to partial 
summary judgment on the question of liability. See Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 56(c) ("A summary judgment, interlocutory in 
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone 
although there is a genuine issue as to the amount of 
damages."). 
 
Accordingly, the order of the District Court granting the 
Bank's motion for summary judgment and denying 
Schnall's cross-motion for partial summary judgment will 
be reversed, and this case will be remanded for further 
proceedings to determine the amount of damages to be 
awarded. 
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